The Polish Sejm passed a bill in mid-February granting amnesty to Poles who fought for Kiev anytime between 6 April 2014 at the start of the Ukrainian Civil War to the present. Under existing legislation, they could face imprisonment of three months to five years for mercenary activity. Per Russian Ambassador-at-Large Rodion Miroshnik’s update around the same time, Poles form the second-largest number of mercenaries in Ukraine behind Latinos. They also participated in Ukraine’s invasion of Kursk.
Russia therefore understandably disapproves of Poland decriminalizing its citizens’ mercenary activity in Ukraine since this de facto amounts to Warsaw’s “plausibly deniable” direct role in daily hostilities. It’s one thing to turn a blind eye to the aforesaid and another entirely to officially absolve them of criminal responsibility for blatantly violating national legislation. From the Kremlin’s perspective, this is incredibly unfriendly and provocative, possibly even presaging more meaningful direct involvement in the future.
From the Polish perspective, however, this move was arguably done only for domestic political purposes. Even though Polish society is increasingly souring on Ukraine, its conflict, and its nationals (both refugees and economic migrants), many still believe that all Poles have the moral right to fight Russia if they so choose for historical reasons beyond the scope of this analysis to explain. Leaving them hypothetically open to criminal prosecution for mercenary activity in Ukraine is accordingly seen as unjust by many.
To be clear, an explanation doesn’t equate to an endorsement, and opinions obviously differ within Polish society and abroad about whether participation in a foreign conflict against the adversary (whether historical and/or contemporary) of one’s own government should be illegal. For instance, the erstwhile Wagner was technically illegal under Russian law, yet the state turned a blind eye to its activities and even reportedly coordinated with it at times in pursuit of shared national interests.
This doesn’t mean that there’s a moral equivalence between Russians defending friendly African countries from Western Hybrid Warfare aggression or fighting to liberate Kiev-occupied territory that Russia now officially considers to be its own and Poles fighting against Russia in Ukraine and Kursk. The only point is that different societies, and different political groups within them, view the general topic of mercenary activity in different ways. Some predictably view it positively and their politicians know that.
As it stands, Poland’s amnesty for mercenaries who fought for Ukraine likely won’t presage more meaningful direct involvement in the future, unlike what some in Russia might expect. Conservative-nationalist President Karol Nawrocki pledged ahead of the second round last May not to authorize the deployment of Polish troops to Ukraine. He’s unlikely to flip-flop on this since nearly two-thirds of Poles oppose it so that would thus reduce his side’s political appeal ahead of fall 2027’s next Sejm elections.
The full-fledged revival of the Russian-Polish rivalry, the initial phase of which was unwittingly sparked by the special operation and then purposely taken to the next level by Warsaw exploiting it in an attempt to revive its long-lost Great Power status with US backing, should therefore remain manageable. More Polish mercenaries might be emboldened by the latest amnesty to flock to Ukraine, but Polish troops aren’t expected to follow them, not least because that could backfire by inciting a Ukrainian insurgency.
