“The De Facto Restoration Of South Yemen Drastically Shifts The Conflict’s Dynamics” by making the re-bifurcation of Yemen into the Southern Transitional Council (STC)-controlled South and Houthi-controlled North a pragmatic compromise for ending the war. After all, they were two separate states prior to 1990, so this would be a return to the pre-unification status quo. The Houthis can’t conquer the South while the STC can’t replace their Houthi enemies in the North with friendly forces so it’s a sensible solution.
This would serve the US’ interests despite the complaints of its Saudi ally, which has spent an unconfirmed but likely astronomical sum on the failed cause of forcibly reunifying Yemen under a friendly national government. The STC is friendly to them but refuses to become their proxies, hence why Riyadh wants the group to cede its gains on the ground to the Saudi-backed national government and abandon its independence aspirations. It has no realistic means of forcing them to do so, though.
By taking the lead in mediating the re-bifurcation of Yemen, the US could obtain privileged access to both countries’ resource wealth as a reward, namely the North’s minerals and the South’s oil. The South is already friendly to the US so it’ll be easier to reach such arrangements with it. This could also include a naval base deal for diversifying from the US’ regional dependence on Djibouti where its position is “deteriorating” due to recent Chinese inroads according to the influential “Project 2025’s” assessment.
The North is unfriendly after the US’ limited (and unsuccessful) bombing campaign, however, which is why any such arrangements would have to be coerced. This can be achieved as part of a package deal for recognizing the Houthis’ control over an independent North Yemen, albeit with strings attached, such as the US, Saudi Arabia, and South Yemen controlling its international trade. The purpose would be to alleviate the humanitarian catastrophe there in a way that prevents Iran from rearming its loyal ally.
The US could also broker security guarantees between North Yemen and its two neighbors for reducing the Houthis’ fears that they might one day attack it if their military strength weakens. About that, it was earlier assessed that “Houthi-Controlled North Yemen Is Poised To Become A Regional Power If Nothing Changes”, but it’s in the US’ interests to avert that (ideally by non-kinetic means). As was proposed, creative diplomacy can advance this through the US’ mediation of political, economic, and security deals.
Neither the US, Saudi Arabia, South Yemen, nor nearby Israel want an Iranian-allied powerhouse on their doorstep, while the Houthis need to rebuild devastated North Yemen and receive the requisite aid for renourishing their people. The proposed quid pro quo, namely international recognition of their control over North Yemen, the restoration of its (strictly controlled) international trade, security guarantees, and humanitarian aid in exchange for partial demilitarization and a US minerals deal, is therefore possible.
It’s not just the US’ national interests that would be advanced by mediating the re-bifurcation of Yemen but Trump’s personal ones too. He could claim credit for ending one of the bloodiest wars this century, saving countless lives by resolving the humanitarian catastrophe in North Yemen, and promoting regional stability by inviting Israeli-friendly South Yemen to join the Abraham Accords after the restoration of its independence. All these interests might thus soon incentivize him to give this a shot.
