Poland has unexpectedly emerged as the main opponent to the deployment of European peacekeepers to Ukraine, which is made all the more significant by its reputation as NATO’s anti-Russian vanguard state, thus preemptively discrediting predictable accusations that it’s “doing the Kremlin’s bidding”. The latest development on this front came after Defense Minister Wladyslaw Kosiniak-Kamysz told Europe to prioritize Ukraine’s reconstruction over peacekeepers otherwise they risk escalating tensions with Russia.
In his words, “I believe that it is more important to send Polish, European and American companies there than to send soldiers. Looking at the UN mission in Lebanon, soldiers are no guarantee of peace. Dozens of countries, from China through all countries, have not guaranteed peace, even on the line where they are stationed… (Furthermore,) if European soldiers from countries bordering Russia were fired upon (in Ukraine) and one of them died, (then) this is already the beginning of an armed conflict (with Russia).”
This atypically pragmatic position is driven by several calculations. First, new US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth declared that his country won’t extend Article 5 guarantees to any NATO members that send its troops there. Second, Poland would stretch its military capabilities to the limit by participating in any such mission. Third, it doesn’t want to place its troops under others’ command. Fourth, it could entail enormous economic costs. And finally, Poles are adamantly against sending troops to Ukraine.
The last point is especially relevant ahead of May’s presidential election that the ruling liberal-globalist coalition wants to win in order to replace the outgoing (and very imperfect) conservative president with one of their own so as to remove this major legal obstacle to their plans for transforming Polish society. While it might have been the initial reason why they began ruling out the scenario of troops late last year, the other factors are now just as influential, if not more. Here are some background briefings:
* 8 November 2024: “Poland’s Deputy Prime Minister Accused Zelensky Of Wanting To Provoke A Polish-Russian War”
* 29 December 2024: “Five Reasons For Poland Not To Directly Participate In Any Ukrainian Peacekeeping Mission”
* 18 February 2025: “The Polish Security Chief Shared Some Interesting Insight About The Ukrainian Conflict’s Endgame”
* 19 February 2025: “Poland Is Once Again Poised To Become The US’ Top Partner In Europe”
* 20 February 2025: “Poland’s Refusal To Dispatch Peacekeepers To Ukraine Imperils European Warmongers’ Plans”
The assessments contained therein are now arguably shared by the Polish leadership itself as evidenced by Kosiniak-Kamysz’s latest words, the impact of which can’t be overestimated in terms of how it might reshape the conversation about sending European peacekeepers to Ukraine. His three points are all valid: 1) post-conflict reconstruction can help a lot more than peacekeepers; 2) peacekeepers don’t keep the peace as proven by Lebanon; and 3) they could even serve as tripwires for World War III.
In the order that they were mentioned, the first might have a self-interested motivation of sorts in that “Polish exports to Ukraine – from machinery to processed foods – are at record highs” according to Politico’s latest report about this, due in no small part to Poland being the EU’s gateway to Ukraine. Simply put, Poland wants to slyly carve out a sphere of economic influence for itself at least in Western Ukraine through these means, which would be free of the costs and risks associated with sending troops.
As for the second point about peacekeepers not actually keeping the peace, that’s undeniable and made more poignant than ever after the latest Lebanon War. Referencing that precedent was meant to instill maximum doubt in the public’s mind about the prospects of a successful peacekeeping mission in Ukraine. This motive circles back to the aforementioned point about Poland’s economic advantages in post-conflict Ukraine’s reconstruction and Warsaw wanting to convince everyone else to follow its lead.
And finally, the last point simply reinforces the former but reminds the public of the potentially existential consequences if something goes wrong with the European elite’s proposed peacekeeping mission in Ukraine. Taken together, Kosiniak-Kamysz’s rhetoric is very powerful and was completely unexpected from most observers, but that’s because Western and Russian ones alike don’t understand contemporary Poland all that well. Its recalibrated strategic calculations therefore deserve closer study.
