Here’s the full interview that I gave to VOA China’s FM Shakil on this subject, excerpts of which were published in their report on 8 December titled “中国在巴基斯坦和阿富汗之间进行调解以保护自身利益能成功吗？”
1. What is your perspective on China’s particular interests in Afghanistan and the motivations for its enduring initiatives to foster peace and stability in the region?
China envisages expanding the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) northward into Afghanistan and thenceforth to the Central Asian Republics in order to breathe new life into this stalled megaproject, but its plans are impeded by very tense Afghan-Pakistani ties. These tensions are due to the worsening security dilemma between them over the Afghan Taliban’s (“Taliban”) suspected patronage of the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP, “Pakistani Taliban)” and their fears of Pakistan moving closer to the US.
Islamabad considers the TTP to be a terrorist group, as does Washington, while Kabul is concerned that Pakistan might allow the US to use its airspace for carrying out anti-terrorist strikes in Afghanistan. Given their conventional military asymmetry, the Taliban might be relying on the TTP as an unconventional means for restoring balance with Pakistan. The TTP, however, is also suspected of allying with Baloch militants like the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) that Pakistan, China, and the US consider to be terrorists.
These same terrorist-designated militants have ramped up attacks since August 2021, specifically targeting Chinese workers and CPEC-related investments. From China’s perspective, helping to alleviate the Afghan-Pakistani security dilemma could lead to less attacks against its nationals and projects, thus enabling CPEC’s revival in Pakistan and its potential expansion to Afghanistan if bilateral ties improve. Seeing as how CPEC is the Belt & Road Initiative’s (BRI) flagship project, this is very important for China.
2. Has Pakistan’s influence in Kabul diminished despite its significant involvement in the Taliban’s training, arming, accommodation, backing, and ascension to power?
The previously described Afghan-Pakistani security dilemma existed even before the Taliban regained control over the country, but it was exacerbated after April 2022’s scandalous change of government in Islamabad, which was perceived by that group as a pro-American regime change operation. This led to them relying more on the TTP as a counterweight to what they expected would become the improvement of Pakistani-US relations with all that could entail for their security as was explained.
Accordingly, the Taliban broke with their Pakistani patrons, who they believed had betrayed their shared cause of removing America from the region. On the other hand, Pakistan believed that it was the Taliban that betrayed their shared cause first by not breaking ties with the TTP after returning to power, which it believed was due to them reverting to their extremist ways. It also deserves mentioning that Afghanistan doesn’t recognize the Durand Line and that more Pashtuns live in Pakistan than in Afghanistan.
These last two factors have traditionally remained a sore spot in their relations and have been exploited by different Afghan governments in the past. The Taliban nowadays considers itself to be a hybrid nationalist-religious organization after expelling American troops from the country, so it makes sense that they’d prioritize a resolution of these two issues in their favor to bolster their nationalist credentials. This represents an existential threat to Pakistan, however, and explains its improved ties with the US.
3. What might be the causes or intentions that have aligned the ultraconservative Taliban with Chinese communists? What are the shared similarities between the two?
Despite nowadays considering themselves to be a hybrid nationalist-religious organization, the Taliban sees no contradiction in cooperating with atheist Chinese communists since they have shared interests. Afghanistan desperately needs foreign investment to rebuild its economy and provide opportunities for improving its people’s lives, while China is interested in pioneering new Eurasian trade routes and exploring resource opportunities like Afghanistan’s reported $1 trillion worth of critical minerals.
China is also Pakistan’s traditional strategic partner so the Taliban might expect that it could exert positive influence on the neighbor to keep the US at arm’s length amidst their post-Imran Khan rapprochement. In the event that this succeeds, which China could be further incentivized to attempt in exchange for privileged mineral extraction contracts, then the Afghan-Pakistani security dilemma might be resolved more in Kabul’s favor, or so the Taliban might expect.
Excerpts from this interview were republished in VOA China’s report on 8 December titled “中国在巴基斯坦和阿富汗之间进行调解以保护自身利益能成功吗？”
